Romans 2:11 New American Bible (NAB)

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Last update - 02:59 09/12/2008
The election campaign in Gaza

The barrages of Qassam rockets and mortar shells being fired from the Gaza Strip at communities in the western Negev, and even at Ashkelon, attest to the collapse of the lull Israel and Hamas had achieved.

At first glance, it seems that those who viewed the lull as a fleeting and pointless episode were right. But such a view fails to take all the facts into account - because it is impossible to ignore the fact that for more than four months, the calm was preserved, proving that Hamas is capable of maintaining almost complete quiet and granting residents of the western Negev, and especially Sderot, a bit of the peace and normalcy that they so badly needed.

It is also important to consider the proximate cause of the collapse: Israel uncovered a tunnel that, it claims, was slated to be used to abduct soldiers. It therefore went into Gaza to blow the tunnel up. During this operation, several Palestinians were killed. That is when Israel and Hamas began shooting at each other again. One could argue that the very fact that the tunnel was dug, along with the intent to kidnap soldiers, constitutes a violation of the truce. But it is equally possible to wonder whether Israel could not have used the information in its possession to thwart that intent without violating the rules of the truce.

The most important question now, however, is not who is to blame; it is how to restore the calm, rehabilitate the truce and stabilize the Gaza border. After all, the cease-fire's collapse does not have to be final and definitive; other truces have been rehabilitated after having lapsed.

Two working assumptions must guide any effort to rehabilitate the truce. One is that Israel and Hamas need each other to the same degree, and the second is that neither Israel nor Hamas has a military option. These are precisely the same assumptions that underlay negotiations to establish the truce in the first place, and there has been no change that would point to the emergence of any other option, military or non-military.

Nevertheless, one thing has changed on the Israeli side: The upcoming election serves as fertile ground for those who like to brandish slogans that drag Gaza and the lull into the political battle. Suddenly, everyone is in uniform, wearing helmets, arming themselves and prepared for war.

It is enough to listen to the indirect exchanges between Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak to understand that politics, not logic, is driving this talk. "We must respond with fire to the rocket launches," declared Livni, aiming an arrow at Barak. "The person responsible for security must act, and I will act in the diplomatic realm." Barak, for his part, vetoed the entry into Gaza of a Qatari aid ship, while his associates accused Livni of bending to pressure. On the sidelines of this quarrel are ministers Shaul Mofaz and Haim Ramon, who talk about "destroying the infrastructure" or launching a large-scale military operation, without offering a convincing explanation, or any explanation at all, as to how such an operation would effect change - or, even more importantly, what its price would be in blood.

Anyone seeking to rehabilitate the truce in Gaza must first obtain a truce on the political battlefield. A bloody front in Gaza and the western Negev is no substitute for the diplomatic logic and political common sense the southern communities are seeking.